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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment V of the Constitution of the United States provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
Amendment VI of the Constitution of the United States provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States provides in 
pertinent part: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
iv 
Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases . . . . 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds 
of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to 
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
v 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime• 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence 
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established by 
public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law 
under which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to 
the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
vi 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
RANDALL D. TUCKER, : Case No. 890423-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. In this case, the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and 
conviction against Mr. Tucker for the crime of Theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it allowed 
the prosecutor to elicit otherwise inappropriate details of the plea 
bargained conviction for attempted forgery overruling the objections 
of Mr. Tucker and refusing to grant a mistrial? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Theft, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1953 as amended). Following two days of trial, May 17 and 18, 
1989, a jury acquitted Mr. Tucker of Burglary, Count II of the 
indictment, but found him guilty of Theft, Count III of the 
indictment. Judgment and conviction was imposed by the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy of the Third Judicial District Court who then 
sentenced Mr. Tucker to zero to five years incarceration at the Utah 
State Prison and ordered him to pay a fine of $1,250 plus 25% 
surcharge. The court then stayed the prison sentence and placed 
Mr. Tucker on probation for thirty-six months with conditions of 
probation including payment of the fine; a six-month jail term; 
recoupment of attorney fees in the amount of $1,000; and 
participation in and completion of an alcohol treatment program to 
be sponsored by Orange Street. This appeal challenges the validity 
of the conviction for Theft. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Randall D. Tucker, Appellant in this case, and 
co-defendant, Henry Kanares, were charged in a combined information 
of three counts each (R. 9-11). Count I involved a burglary of a 
small shed located at 1186 South Redwood Road in Salt Lake County 
which occurred on or about March 27, 1989. Count II involved a 
burglary of that same shed at the same location on or about 
March 29, 1989. Count III involved a theft from the same location 
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on or about March 29, 1989, Both parties originally pleaded not 
guilty to all three counts. Count I, however, was dismissed as 
against Appellant, Randall D. Tucker, at the preliminary hearing 
held in circuit court (R. 3-4). 
The trial was scheduled May 17-18, 1989. On the morning of 
the first day of trial, co-defendant, Henry Kanares, opted to 
withdraw his pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to 
Count II of the Information (R. 45-51, 54). Counts I and III were 
then dismissed against him (R. 54). Appellant, Randall Tucker, 
insisting he was not guilty of the charges, proceeded to trial on 
Count II and Count III, the burglary and theft of property charges 
from the small shed located at 1186 South Redwood Road on or about 
March 29, 1989. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Tucker filed a Motion in Limine to 
prohibit the State from introducing evidence of prior convictions 
against him (R. 55-56). That motion was argued to the court on the 
first day of trial (R. 123 at 2-15). The State insisted and the 
court agreed that a prior conviction of attempted forgery from 1988 
would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence as a crime of dishonesty or false statement (R. 123 at 11, 
15). The trial court required that the official file of Mr. Tucker 
from that attempted forgery case be produced from the records 
department and examined (R. 123 at 9). Mr. Tucker had pleaded 
guilty to that charge, and, from that file, the trial court later 
placed into evidence Stated Exhibit 16-S, the Affidavit of 
Defendant (R. 125 at 45). Based on that Affidavit of Defendant, 
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which detailed the plea agreement in that case including the element 
of intent to defraud, the trial court supported its ruling to deny 
Mr. Tucker's Motion in Limine (R. 123 at 11-15). Nonetheless, 
Mr. Tucker requested a continuing objection to the admission of the 
prior conviction evidence as impeachment testimony, and the same was 
granted (R. 123 at 15). 
At trial, the testimony of Mr. Tucker disclosed that he had 
known Mr. Kanares for approximately one year prior to March 29, 1989 
(R. 125 at 15). Co-defendant Kanares was a friend of his mother's 
boyfriend (R. 125 at 16). Mr. Tucker met Mr. Kanares through that 
relationship when Mr. Kanares asked Mr. Tucker to work as a mechanic 
to repair Mr. Kanares' automobile (R. 125 at 15-16). Mr. Tucker 
testified that on March 29, 1989, he examined Mr. Kanares' car and 
that the 29th was the only day he had ever actually been with 
Mr. Kanares (R. 125 at 16). After working on Mr. Kanares' car, he 
explained that he needed a ride home and that Mr. Kanares agreed to 
drive him to his home (R. 125 at 17). Mr. Tucker testified that 
enroute to his house, while traveling on Redwood Road, Mr. Kanares 
informed Mr. Tucker that he (Mr. Kanares) needed to stop and pick up 
some property (R. 125 at 17). 
Mr. Kanares and Mr. Tucker then pulled into a large 
driveway off Redwood Road near a small shack just prior to noon. 
Mr. Kanares got out of the car and went to the shack. Mr. Tucker 
remained at the car (R. 123 at 19; R. 125 at 18). Within moments, a 
ninety-year-old man, later identified as Mr. Harvey D. Hansen, 
arrived at the property in his own automobile and parked behind that 
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of Mr, Kanares (R. 125 at 18-19). Mr. Hansen informed Mr. Tucker 
that it was his property and asked Mr. Tucker what they were doing 
there (R. 123 at 21; R. 125 at 19). Testimony of the parties 
differs from this point forward. 
Mr. Hansen testified that the trunk of Mr. Kanares' car was 
opened and that property belonging to him and his son were within 
the trunk of the car and on the back seat (R. 123 at 17). He 
indicated that he knew what was going on—implying a burglary and 
theft—and that it was important he get a description of the car and 
the license plate (R. 123 at 22). Mr. Hansen testified that he then 
copied down the number of the license plate (R. 123 at 22). He 
testified that while he was noting the license plate number, another 
individual returned to the car from the shed (R. 123 at 28). He 
explained that Mr. Tucker and this other individual then got in the 
car and drove away (R. 123 at 22). He returned to his residence, 
called the Salt Lake City Police Department, and gave them the 
information including the license number (R. 123 at 23). 
Salt Lake City police officers responded in a joint effort 
with West Valley City police officers to the address of Mr. Kanares, 
a trailer park in West Valley City (R. 125 at 7). At that 
residence, the officers located Mr. Kanares, the automobile, and 
ultimately Mr. Tucker, who had been hiding under a bed in a bedroom 
of the mobile home (R. 125 at 6). Mr. Hansen was brought to the 
property; he identified the automobile and some of the property 
within the automobile as belonging to himself and his son (R. 123 at 
78-80). Mr. Kanares and Mr. Tucker were also identified and placed 
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under arrest (R. 123 at 79-81) . 
Mr. Tucker7s testimony contradicted that of Mr. Hansen. He 
indicated that while at the residence on March 29, 1989, no property 
was actually placed in the automobile; that after Mr. Hansen had 
arrived at the address, Mr. Kanares informed Mr. Tucker that they 
needed to return to his place in West Valley City where Mr. Kanares 
began to load property from the residence into the automobile to 
return to the location on Redwood Road (R. 125 at 20-22). 
Mr. Tucker admitted that he had been found hiding under the bed in a 
bedroom at the trailer court and explained that he was scared at the 
sight of the police officers (R. 125 at 23). Mr. Tucker explained 
that he feared he would get into trouble, and on the suggestion of 
another, went in the bedroom to hide (R. 125 at 23). Mr. Tucker 
further testified that, to his knowledge, no crime had been 
committed. He admitted that once Mr. Hansen had arrived, he had a 
"bad inkling that something wrong was going on" but, at that point, 
was still unsure (R. 12 5 at 30). He further testified that it was 
he who actually read the number of the license plate to Mr. Hansen 
while Mr. Hansen wrote it down (R. 125 at 32). 
During direct examination, Mr. Tucker admitted the 
attempted forgery conviction of 1988, indicating the nature of the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of that offense (R. 125 at 
24-25). He explained that he had shared an account with his sister 
and that when she refused to release money to him, he forged her 
name on a check (R. 125 at 25). He affirmed that he had pled guilty 
to the crime (R. 125 at 25). 
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On cross-examinationf the prosecutor questioned in detail 
Mr. Tucker's recollection of the attempted forgery conviction, 
soliciting from him information which exceeded that contained in the 
plea agreement and which included questioning about an alleged 
although uncharged cocaine drug involvement (R. 125 at 25-27). An 
objection was lodged with the court regarding the examination of the 
prosecutor into details of the prior conviction, specifically 
pointing out the Rule 404(b) violations inherent in such examination 
(R. 125 at 27). A side bar was held out of the hearing of the jury 
where Mr. Tucker additionally lodged a Motion for Mistrial, later 
placed on the record and denied by the trial court (R. 125 at 27, 
39-43). 
In support of the prosecution's case, Mr. Harvey D. 
Hansen's son, Thomas Franklin Hansen, was also called to testify. 
He identified property which had been taken from the shed at the 
Redwood Road address and substantiated the values of that property 
(R. 123, 48-49, 59). Thomas Hansen confirmed that the shed had been 
broken into on other occasions and specifically that the shed had 
been broken into several days before March 29 (R. 123 at 54). 
Several police officers were also called as witnesses for 
the State. Daniel R. Despain, a Salt Lake City patrolman, testified 
that he was the officer who had accompanied Mr. Hansen, Sr. to West 
Valley City to the trailer home of Mr. Kanares. He substantiated 
that, at that premises, Mr. Hansen identified several pieces of 
property located in the automobile of Mr. Kanares (R. 123 at 80). 
Grant Elsby, a West Valley City police officer, testified 
- 7 -
that he was the first officer to arrive at the address of 
Mr. Kanares (R. 125 at 2-3, 8). He testified that upon entering the 
residence, Mr. Kanares denied the presence of another individual 
but, after seeking permission to look, he located Mr. Tucker hiding 
under a bed (R. 125 at 6). Officer Elsby further testified that 
upon arrival, two West Valley City Police cars showed up along with 
two, maybe three, from Salt Lake City (R. 125 at 7). He testified 
that several of the officers were uniformed (R. 125 at 8). 
After the defense rested, the prosecutor asked for a short 
recess, during the conclusion of which he informed defense counsel 
he would call Mr. Kanares as a rebuttal witness. Over objection, 
Mr. Kanares testified on direct examination that he committed the 
March 29 burglary and that Mr. Tucker assisted him to move property 
from the inside of the shed to the outside and then to the 
automobile (R. 125 at 66). On cross-examination, Mr. Kanares 
admitted that he had told Mr. Tucker's counsel on no less than three 
occasions that Mr. Kanares had acted alone and that Mr. Tucker was 
not responsible for any criminal act (R. 125 at 69). Mr. Kanares 
testified that the State had not done anything to procure his 
testimony (R. 125 at 75). On recross-examination, he did 
acknowledge that two other third degree felony charges were 
dismissed against him by the State (R. 125 at 75). 
The case was ultimately presented to the jury, who, after 
deliberations, acquitted Mr. Tucker of the burglary charge but 
convicted him of theft (R. 59, 60, 65-66). This appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed plain error and/or abused its 
discretion by permitting the State to cross-examine for impeachment 
purposes beyond the mere fact of the conviction. The trial court 
overruled an objection to the improper impeachment and also denied a 
Motion for Mistrial, both founded on Rule 404(b), erroneously ruling 
that the door had been opened on direct examination and that 
Rule 404(b) was inappropriate to the issue. Mr. Tucker did not open 
the door to such testimony; but even assuming he had, competent case 
authority forbids impeachment by prior conviction evidence to 
violate Rule 404(b). The trial court's erroneous ruling requires 
reversal of Mr. Tucker's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
PERMITTING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE INAPPROPRIATE 
DETAILS AND ALLEGATIONS BEYOND THE PERMISSIBLE 
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION OF 
ATTEMPTED FORGERY. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Tucker filed a motion in limine to 
prohibit the State from using prior convictions of Mr. Tucker to 
impeach his testimony if he were to take the stand in his own behalf 
(R. 55-56). That motion was argued on the first day of trial out of 
the presence of the jury (R. 123 at 2-15). The court ruled that a 
1988 misdemeanor conviction for attempted forgery would be 
appropriate for impeachment purposes and denied the motion (R. 123 
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at 12-15) . Mr. Tucker sought and obtained a continuing objection to 
that ruling (R. 123 at 15). 
Mr. Tucker testified in his own behalf and admitted the 
1988 misdemeanor conviction of attempted forgery (R. 125 at 24-25). 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Mr. Tucker on 
unadjudicated details of the plea bargained conviction beyond the 
permissible scope of cross-examination for impeachment purposes 
(R. 125 at 25-27). The prosecutor also introduced contested claims 
of problems of cocaine usage by Mr. Tucker (R. 125 at 27). 
Mr. Tucker objected to the examination of the prosecutor; a side bar 
was held, and the court allowed the questioning to continue over the 
objection of Mr. Tucker (R. 125 at 27-29). (A verbatim reproduction 
of the attempted forgery examination is contained infra at 
subpoint D and attached at Addendum A.) 
At the conclusion of Mr. Tucker's testimony, the defense 
rested and a recess was taken by the court (R. 125 at 38). On 
returning from the recess, out of the presence of the jury, 
Mr. Tucker made a motion for a mistrial previously reserved at the 
side bar noted above (R. 125 at 39-40). That mistrial motion 
complained that the prosecutor introduced information beyond the 
conviction of attempted forgery contrary to impeachment principles 
and evidence rule 404(b) (R. 125 at 40-41). The trial court denied 
the new trial motion ruling that Mr. Tucker had "opened the door" 
entitling the prosecution to address the questions asked on 
cross-examination (R. 125 at 41-42). The trial court then ruled 
that a copy of the affidavit from the 1988 attempted forgery case be 
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marked and made a part of the record instructing that it was not to 
be provided to the jury (R. 125 at 44-47; Exhibit 16-S)• 
Mr. Tucker avers that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error when it overruled his objection to the State's 
cross-examination beyond the mere fact of the conviction. The trial 
court also erred in denying the motion for a mistrial as the 
prosecutor had improperly introduced allegations of drug usage into 
the prior conviction of attempted forgery. Mr. Tucker urges that he 
did not open the door to such testimony; but even assuming he had 
opened the door, the cross-examination of the prosecutor exceeded 
permissible impeachment and violated Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence prejudicing the jury against him. 
A. MR. TUCKER'S 1988 CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED 
FORGERY IS A CRIME OF DISHONESTY OR FALSE 
STATEMENT. 
Subsequent to Mr. Tuckers trial, this Court held in 
State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 530-31 (Utah App. 1989), that a prior 
conviction for attempted forgery is automatically admissible for 
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Mr. Tucker acknowledged in his Affidavit of Defendant 
when pleading guilty to the attempted forgery the element of 
"purpose to defraud." He now concedes the prior conviction was 
admissible for impeachment purposes. 
Despite that concession, however, prejudicial error 
occurred in his case when the prosecutor exceeded permissible 
impeachment practices by going beyond the facts of the case as 
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articulated in the plea bargain agreement and introduced other 
crimes, wrongs or acts contrary to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
B. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE IS 
LIMITED TO NARROW INQUIRIES ONLY. 
A long established principle of jurisprudence recognizes 
that impeachment by prior conviction evidence must be limited to 
questioning the defendant on the narrow area of conviction, nature 
of the crime and punishment. United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376 
(10th Cir. 1977) . Some courts have offered variations of the 
permissible cross-examination by allowing questions into the subject 
of crime, date and disposition, see Campbell v. Greer. 831 F.2d 700 
(7th Cir. 1987) , and cases cited therein, and a few courts have 
allowed questioning regarding the length of confinement. United 
States v. Barnes, 622 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980), and cases cited 
therein. 
Courts have routinely cautioned that care must be taken 
during impeachment by prior conviction evidence to not permit 
counsel to explore the details of a witness7 past convictions, 
United States v. Castro. 788 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir. 1986), and further 
indicated the scope of the cross-examination should be so limited to 
avoid the confusion of collateral issues and to avoid unfairness to 
the defendant. United States v. Roeniqk, 810 F.2d 809, 814-15 (8th 
Cir. 1987). 
The above-noted rule acknowledging that it is error to 
- 12 -
inquire about the details of prior criminal conduct is so well 
established that such error is cognizable despite the absence of any 
objection by defense counsel. United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 
84, 88-89 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 
246, 250 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644, 
647 (3rd Cir. 1970); and United States v. Pennix. 313 F.2d 524, 531 
(4th Cir. 1963). Courts have further held that a cautionary 
instruction limiting the scope of the permissible impeachment by 
prior conviction evidence cannot correct the error and obviate the 
prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246, 
248-49 (7th Cir. 1972). 
Courts have identified that the problem with excessive 
references to details of prior criminal conduct is that the jury is 
likely to infer that the defendant is more likely to have committed 
the offense for which he is being tried than if he had previously 
led a blameless life. United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 
(7th Cir. 1975) ; see 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 57 at 1185 (Tillers 
rev. 1983) ("The deep tendency of human nature to punish not because 
our victim is guilty this time but because he is a bad man and may 
as well be condemned now that he is caught is a tendency that cannot 
fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court.11); see, also. 
United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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C. AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE EXISTS BUT 
THAT EXCEPTION IS LIMITED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF 
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND UNDUE PREJUDICE AS 
GUIDED BY EVIDENCE RULES 403 AND 404. 
Importantly, an exception to the above rule which limits 
the prosecutor's ability to query into details of the conviction has 
been noted as "whenever defendant attempts to explain away the 
effect of a conviction or to minimize his guilt, [he] may be 
cross-examined on any facts relevant to direct examination." United 
States v. Amahia. 825 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1987). See, also. 
United States v. Wolf. 561 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977) (defendant has 
no right to set forth to the jury all of the facts which tend in his 
favor without laying himself open to cross-examination on those 
facts); United States v. Barnes. 622 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(prosecutor permitted to elicit length of incarceration from 
defendant in response to defendant's attempt to "explain away" his 
prior conviction). 
This exception to the general rule—forbidding examination 
into details of the prior convictions unless the defendant attempts 
to "explain away" the conviction—is itself limited. Courts have 
explained that wnile room is allowed for prosecutors to counter a 
defendant's attempt to "explain away" a conviction, care must be 
taken during that cross-examination to avoid Rule 404(b) problems. 
United States v. Wolf. 561 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (10th Cir. 1977) 
(trend to restrict prejudicing prior conviction evidence culminated 
in adoption of Rules 609, 404(b) and 103(d) of the Rules of 
Evidence; care should be taken to protect the accused from being 
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convicted because of past conduct and not the current charges); 
United States v. Tumblin. 551 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(evidence of prior convictions is to be considered for impeachment 
purposes only, and theme permitting the conviction to establish 
conformity with criminal behavior requires reversal). 
D. THE EXAMINATION OF MR. TUCKER REGARDING HIS 
PRIOR CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED FORGERY VIOLATED 
PROPER IMPEACHMENT PRINCIPLES TO HIS DETRIMENT. 
At the conclusion of Mr. Tucker's direct examination, his 
counsel questioned him as follows: 
Q (By Ms. Wells) Mr. Tucker, have you previously 
been convicted of any criminal offenses? 
A Yes. 
Q And what was that offense and when? 
A In March of 1988 I was convicted of a forgery, 
attempted forgery. Attempted forgery, Class A 
misdemeanor. 
Q And that was a misdemeanor rather than a felony? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you please explain briefly the 
circumstances surrounding that offense and your 
ultimate conviction? Let me ask: Did you 
enter a plea in that matter? 
A Yes. 
Q What were the circumstances surrounding that 
case? 
A My sister and I were sharing a house, and I was 
putting my money into her bank account. We had 
a dispute and I wanted my money out of her 
account. It's a joint account with my mothers 
name on the checks. 
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She wouldn't refund my money, my parents were 
on vacation and I needed my money cause I was 
moving out of the house. And in order to get 
another house I needed my money. So I forged 
my sister's signature to get my money. 
Q How much money was involved? 
A Less than $100. 
Q Again, did you enter a plea of guilty after 
being charged with that offense? 
A Yes. 
(R. 125 at 24-25). Direct examination was then completed and the 
prosecutor began his cross-examination. 
Q [by Mr. Jones] Mr. Tucker, do you think you 
have a good recollection of the case for which 
you pled guilty to? 
A Do I— 
Q The attempted forgery that you just talked 
about to the jury? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Isn't it true that you stole five checks from 
your mother? 
A Yes. 
Q One of the checks—the one you pled guilty to 
was in excess of $500, wasn't it? 
A I think so. 
Q So you are not telling the Jury that you stole 
$100, are you? 
A No. 
Q How much, all totaled, did you steal from your 
mother through those checks? 
A Number one, I didn't steal it. It was my money. 
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Q Well, you took checks, you stole blank checks 
from your mother, didn't you? 
A I did. 
Q And you forged her signature on five of those? 
A I did. 
Q How much money did you take? 
A I would say around six hundred something. 
Q You are telling us that the one check was in 
excess of $500 and the other four altogether 
only totaled $100? 
A There was a few that were not cashed. There 
was one in my wallet that had never been cashed. 
Q Well, isn't it true that you had had these 
checks for some time? 
A Yes. 
Q How long had you had these checks? 
A Probably three days. 
Q You didn't have them more like three months? 
A I don't think so. 
Q Isn't it true that the reason that you took the 
checks and cashed them was to support your drug 
habit? 
A No. 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I would object—I would ask 
the Court for a ruling and would like to approach 
the Bench. 
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection. 
The door has been opened as to the purpose for the 
money on direct examination. 
MS. WELLS: I don't believe that the door was opened 
in that it wasn't asked of him for what purpose. He 
merely said it was his money. And I think what this 
does is goes to a rule of evidence 404 problem. 
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THE COURT: Do you need to proceed further on this? 
MR. JONES: I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's come to the side bar for just a 
moment. 
(Bench conference off the record.) 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Tucker, is it your 
testimony to the Jury that the only reason you 
took those five checks is because you were 
entitled to the money? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember filling out a statement, kind 
of a questionnaire or statement why you took 
that money? 
A To a certain degree, yes. 
Q Did you ever tell anyone in that statement that 
the reason you took the money was to support a 
drug habit? 
A I can't remember. 
Q Were you on cocaine in April of 1988? 
A Had I used cocaine? 
Q Yes. 
A A few times, yes. 
Q Did you have a drug problem? 
A Not really a problem. 
Q Well, have you entered or been ordered to go 
into a drug rehabilitation program? 
A I completed it, yes. 
Q Did you complete the program? 
A Yes. 
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Q And when was that? 
A I was ordered in, I think, June of 1988, to go. 
Q Was it your testimony that you didn't have a 
drug problem at the time you entered that plea? 
A No. I entered a plea of guilty. 
Q Excuse me, in April of 1988— 
A Yes, sir. 
Q —you had a drug problem at that time? 
A It was going to become a problem, yes. 
Q What about in March of 1989? 
A I have been clean for over a year. 
Q You were unemployed at the time of this 
incident? 
A Yes. 
Q And it's your testimony that you just happened 
to be in the wrong place at the wrong time on 
March 29, 1989? 
A So to speak. 
Q You had no idea what your friend was up to? 
A Exactly. 
Q You weren't on drugs that day? 
A No. 
Q Is it true that the only person who was hiding 
when the officers got there was yourself? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And your testimony is that Mr. Kanares is the 
one who was responsible for this burglary and 
theft; is that right? 
A Yes. 
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Q But he wasn't hiding, was he? 
A No, he was not. 
Q And the only reason you were hiding is because 
you were afraid? 
A That, and I had a speeding ticket that had went 
to a warrant, and I have done thirty days in 
jail on the forgery, and I had no desire to go 
back to jail. 
Q You weren't hiding, I guess, because of what 
happened over at Mr. Hansen's property? 
A No. At the time on the forgery I was beat up 
real bad by the police, and again that same day. 
(R. 125 at 25-29). 
At the first opportunity following Mr. Tucker's testimony, 
a Motion for Mistrial—previously reserved at the side bar noted 
above—was placed on the record (R. 125 at 38-41). Counsel 
expressly stated her concerns regarding 404(b) violations which 
prejudiced Mr. Tucker (R. 125 at 40-41). The trial court disagreed 
and responded that Rule 404(b) was not appropriately involved in the 
consideration; he denied the Motion for Mistrial (R. 125 at 41-42). 
(The motion as placed on the record and the court's ruling are 
reproduced at Addendum B.) 
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
Several problems exist with the trial court's ruling to 
permit the deviation from the normal rule in this case. First, the 
prior conviction in this case involved a plea bargained adjudication 
and not a conviction following a trial. The trial court expressly 
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recognized this fact earlier in the case when it sent the court 
bailiff to the record department for the official file in this case 
and removed from that file and had placed into evidence a copy of 
the Affidavit of Defendant, the plea agreement in this case (R. 123 
at 7-10; R. 125 at 44-45). That agreement indicates that the prior 
conviction of Mr. Tucker for attempted forgery establishes the 
elements as follows: 
Defendant attempted to make, complete, execute, 
authenticate, issue, or utter a check having a face 
amount less than $100.00 so that such purported to 
be the act of another, with the purpose to defraud. 
State's Exhibit 16-S; see Addendum C. The facts of the case are 
listed as: 
Defendant presented a check for cashing knowing it 
was forged and he had no permission. 
State's Exhibit 16-S; see Addendum C. 
The additional questioning brought out on cross-examination 
by the prosecutor in this case exceeded the adjudicated facts. 
Rule 609 clearly indicates, as do the cases noted above, that only 
convictions are permissible inquiry during impeachment by 
cross-examination. It has been long established that neither 
arrests nor unlitigated allegations are a permissible basis for 
impeachment evidence. United States v. Pennix. 313 F.2d 524, 529 
(4th Cir. 1963). 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the problem of 
attempting to impeach a witness with the unlitigated details of a 
plea bargained prior conviction. In Terrv v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314, 
323 (Utah 1979), the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
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decision that considerations of delay, confusion of issues, the 
potential for misleading the jury, and prejudice to the defendant 
warranted exclusion of the "substantive facts" of a plea bargained 
conviction because it would result in a retrial of the case. The 
Court stated: 
The prior arrest was followed by a guilty plea by 
the plaintiff. Due to the lack of a trial on the 
merits in the first instance many controverted 
points concerning that incident would have to be 
tried for the first time at the present proceeding. 
Id. at 323 n.29. 
The Affidavit of Defendant comprised the adjudicated facts 
of the attempted forgery conviction. Mr. Tucker pleaded guilty to 
one forged check of an amount less than one hundred dollars. See 
Addendum C. The prosecutor, however, introduced the jurors to five 
checks with a total value of six hundred dollars (R. 125 at 25-26). 
Additionally, he wrongly characterized the amount of the forged 
check contained in the plea bargained conviction as a check in 
excess of five hundred dollars rather than a check of less than one 
hundred dollars. Compare R. 125 at 26 with Addendum C. Finally, 
the prosecutor introduced a new crime or wrong into the attempted 
forgery conviction by referring to the theft of the five checks and 
managing to reiterate the words "stole," "steal" or "took" on no 
less than eight occasions during the supposed impeachment inquiry 
(R. 125 at 25-28). 
While the above unadjudicated details were not specifically 
objected to at trial, Mr. Tucker now insists their presentation to 
the jurors constituted plain error. He urges that this Court agree 
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with the concerns noted by the Court in Terry v, ZCMI that the State 
not be permitted to try its attempted forgery case for the first 
time as a part of the theft case against him. 
Second, the impeachment rule, Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, focuses on credibility concerns only. At issue in 
impeachment evaluations is whether the defendant may take the stand 
and testify untruthfully. The jury is entitled to be aware of only 
those convictions which may impugn his credibility. See State v. 
Bruce. 779 P.2d 646, 653-56 (Utah 1989); State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 
9, 11 (Utah 1989); State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-35 (Utah 
1986); see, also. United States v. Roeniqk, 810 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Harding. 525 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1975). Even 
assuming that Mr. Tucker's testimony can be categorized as an 
attempt to explain away or minimize his conviction, the ability of 
the prosecutor to introduce other details beyond the plea bargained 
conviction must be consistent with the impeachment purpose. As 
noted above, impeachment inquiries are appropriately proscribed 
whenever such evidence may be misused to prove conformity with the 
purported bad character of a person. Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983) ; see subpoint C, supra. The prosecutor's questions 
in this case went beyond impeachment in an attempt to establish bad 
character in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Mr. Tucker specifically objected based on Rule 404(b) 
claiming that the allegations of cocaine usage coupled with 
unemployment charges directly implicated bad character prohibited by 
Rule 404(b). The objection to this questioning should have been 
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sustained and the Motion for Mistrial should have been granted• 
This issue is properly preserved for appeal and may be decided on an 
abuse of discretion standard. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). Neither the rule itself 
nor interpretations of the rule under Utah case law allows the 
comparison of periods of unemployment nor introduction of drug 
(cocaine) usage into this case for any reason, let alone for 
impeachment purposes. In State v, Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 
1989), the Supreme Court stated that evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts may be admitted only if such evidence has "a special 
relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose 
other than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality.11 
Id. at 426 (quoting State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988) 
citing State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)). 
Relying on State v. Featherson. this Court reiterated that 
other crimes evidence that passes the 404(b) test (i.e., relevant 
beyond proving mere criminal disposition) is still subject to the 
protections of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. State v. 
Cox. 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App. January 31, 1990). Rule 403 
provides: 
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Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). The application of 
Rule 403 requires balancing the probative value of the questioned 
evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice; the balancing 
contemplates considerations such as the need for the evidence and 
the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. State v. Coxf 127 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19 
(citing State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295). 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined the notion of "unfair 
prejudice" as follows: 
The term "prejudicial" should be construed to mean 
inflammatory in the sense that the jury may use the 
conviction against the defendant for purposes other 
than determining the defendant's credibility, and 
therefore would tend to induce the jury to render a 
verdict outside the relevant substantive evidence 
bearing on the material elements of the crime. 
State v. Slowe. 728 P.2d 110, 112-13 (Utah 1986). The trial court's 
ruling permitted the State, under the guise of impeachment, to 
examine Mr. Tucker in a method which placed before the jurors 
information purposed to inflame them against Mr. Tucker and to 
induce a decision outside the relevant evidence and pertinent facts 
of the theft case before them. 
Contrary to rules 404(b) and 403, the State was allowed to 
inquire into details, and obtain at least partial admissions, on 
information unrelated to impeachment. The State's examination into 
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unadjudicated details of other crimes or wrongs not part of the plea 
bargained conviction, particularly the allegations of cocaine usage 
to the level of a drug habit, were highly improper under the 
circumstances of this case. These errors not only resulted in 
violations of rules 403 and 404(b), they also abrogated fundamental 
rights guaranteed Mr. Tucker under federal and state constitutional 
provisions assuring him due process and the right to a fair trial. 
United States Constitution, Amendments V, VI and XIV; Utah 
Constitution, Article I, §§7 and 12.1 
In United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1975), 
the circuit court made the following observation in support of its 
decision to reverse the conviction of the accused: 
The rule that it is error to inquire about the 
details of prior criminal conduct is so well 
established that such error is cognizable despite 
the absence of any objection by defense counsel. 
Id. at 88-89. In Harding, the court found error even in the absence 
of an objection to the prosecutors questions which in part implied 
that the defendant had testified falsely about his prior 
conviction. The court stated: 
1
 Notably, our Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that 
Utah's due process clause may well exceed the protections afforded 
under the federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 
1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 
1986). The Court actually has already extended Utah's due process 
protections safeguarding against the prejudicing effect of other 
crimes evidence in another context. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738, 742 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 
1980) (due process violated when prejudicial other crimes evidence 
reaches the jury where severance would have cured the prejudice). 
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In addition to the improper inquiry about details of 
the prior offense, some of the prosecutor's 
questions implied that appellant testified falsely 
about the offense even though the prosecutor knewf 
or certainly should have known, that his testimony 
was accurate. Thus, he asked if the offense was not 
possession with intent to distribute, rather than 
simple possession, and later, whether the defendant 
was not mistaken in his description of the offense. 
It is true, of course, that possession of 80 pounds 
of marijuana strongly implied guilt of possession 
with an intent to distribute, but this fact does not 
justify the federal prosecutor's misdescription of 
the charge which the State of Indiana elected to 
prosecute. The misdescription was prejudicial in 
two ways: first, it characterized the earlier 
offense as somewhat more serious than it actually 
was; second, and of greater importance, it 
improperly implied that the prosecutor knew the 
witness was lying when, in fact, he knew that the 
witness was telling the truth. 
Id. at 90-91. 
As in Harding, the prosecutor in this case improperly 
implied that Mr. Tucker had lied when he failed to admit more than 
one check and an amount over one hundred dollars. The Harding Court 
acknowledged this type of behavior as establishing greater prejudice 
than the implication that the crime was more serious than it was. 
Both problems are present in the case at bar. As in Harding, this 
Court should find plain error in the trial court's ruling allowing 
the detailed cross-examination into the facts of other checks and 
amounts beyond the plea bargained conviction. 
In United States v. Roenigk. 810 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1987), 
the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction because the prosecutor 
had exceeded permissible impeachment principles by excessive 
exploration of the details behind the impeaching prior conviction. 
The Roenigk Court explained that excessive references to details of 
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prior criminal conduct improperly allows jurors to infer a defendant 
is more likely to have committed the charged offense. Id. at 815. 
The Court stated that such behavior by the government "may be so 
prejudicial as to amount to plain error." Id. at 814. 
At issue in Roeniak was a relationship between the 
defendant and a known drug trafficker. The amount of emphasis 
placed on this relationship and the crimes of the drug trafficker 
improperly allowed the jurors to consider and find the defendant was 
more likely to have committed the crime of perjury; the court called 
this possibility an improper basis and reversed under both plain 
error and an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 816. 
In United States v. Tumblin, 551 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1977), 
the prosecutor examined the defendant about details behind his 
convictions including length of confinement, periods between 
confinement and defendant's unemployment between crimes. Id. at 
1002. The Court found the questions regarding the unemployment 
status of the defendant between crimes to particularly exceed the 
scope of reasonable cross-examination. The Court stated: 
The obvious significance of this questioning was not 
to damage defendant's credibility as a witness—the 
fact of conviction alone achieved that goal—but 
instead to suggest, quite improperly, that defendant 
was a man who had spent most of his young life 
committing and serving time for the crimes, rather 
than being gainfully employed. 
Id. at 1004. 
While Mr. Tucker's criminal history in no way parallels 
that of appellant Tumblin, the prosecutor's use of this type of 
questioning on cross-examination in this case—connecting the prior 
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conviction and alleged drug habit to an assertion of drug usage and 
unemployment in connection with the instant offense—was in no way 
lost on the jury. The effect on Mr. Tucker was the same as in 
Tumblin; the accused's substantial rights were prejudiced. In 
Tumblin, the Court rejected a claim of harmless error and found 
reversible error to have occurred. This Court should similarly find. 
Notably, in both United States v. Harding and United 
States v. Roenicrk, the courts noted that a limiting instruction had 
not been given. 525 F.2d at 91, and 810 F.2d at 816 n.2, 
respectively. In neither case was this concern the dispositive 
factor. Id. However, the court in United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 
246 (7th Cir. 1972), examined this issue directly. The Dow court 
noted that questions aimed at obtaining details beyond the mere fact 
of the conviction itself to show a pattern of conduct and inflame 
the jury is reprehensible, amounts to plain error, and does such 
extensive and serious damage that the harm cannot be removed by a 
cautionary instruction limiting the use of the information. Id. at 
250. Therefore, the fact that the trial court sua sponte provided a 
limiting instruction to jurors at the time of the impeachment 
(R. 125 at 34) and then again in general instructions (R. 79) can in 
no way obviate the prejudice inherent in the prosecutor's improper 
examination. 
In State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court observed that the requirements for finding plain 
error, obviousness and harmfulness, pose no rigid and insurmountable 
barrier for review. Id. at 35 n.8. The above discussion 
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demonstrates both requirements have been met on the facts of this 
case and that the substantial rights of Mr. Tucker have been 
violated. Similarly, the above cases go a long way to establish 
that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the 
objection lodged by Mr. Tucker and in denying his Motion for 
Mistrial. Notably, the Roenigk court found an abuse of discretion 
by the trial court for failing to sustain the objection to testimony 
which presented evidence of an alleged drug involvement between the 
defendant and a known drug dealer and which bore no relationship to 
the charged crime or impeachment under Rule 609(a). 810 F.2d at 
815-16. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that where a reasonable 
likelihood exists that the error complained of affected the outcome 
of the trial, eroding confidence in the verdict and suggesting that 
absent the error more than a mere possibility exists that the 
defendant would obtain a more favorable result, reversal of the 
conviction is warranted. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 
1989); State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). This case 
is such a case. Numerous reasons exist to establish the erosion of 
confidence necessary to merit a new trial. 
Notably, recent cases from the Utah Supreme Court 
demonstrate a strong aversion to the gratuitous admission of 
evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts. State v. James, 767 P.2d 
549, 556-57 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 494-98 (Utah 
1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring opinion, joined by Stewart, J., and 
Durham, J.); State v. Lanier. 778 P.2d 9, 10-11 (Utah 1989); 
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State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738f 741 (Utah 1985). See, also. 
State v. Cox, 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 19-20 (Ct. App. January 31, 
1990) (prior unprosecuted sexual assaults not so unique nor current 
enough to outweigh prejudice inherent in admission into evidence; 
reversal required). 
Also, the State's case was far from overwhelming. The jury 
acquitted Mr. Tucker of the burglary charge despite the 
co-defendant's testimony that Mr. Tucker assisted in the burglary 
and the theft (R. 125 at 66). No doubt this fact strongly states 
that the testimony of Mr. Kanares was ignored by the jurors inasmuch 
as he admitted informing defense counsel on three separate occasions 
that Mr. Tucker was not involved in the crimes and that his story 
changed only after the State dismissed two other third degree felony 
charges against him (R. 125 at 69, 75). Other than Mr. Kanares' 
testimony, the case against Mr. Tucker was wholly circumstantial. 
Admittedly, evidence was adduced by Mr. Tucker himself that 
he was present at the Redwood Road address and that he was later 
found hiding under a bed at the Kanares' residence where stolen 
property was found in Mr. Kanares' car (R. 125 at 17-23). This 
evidence, however, does not establish the crime of theft. 
Mr. Tucker's explanations for his behavior were consistent with 
innocence. Because of the circumstantial nature of the case against 
him, Mr. Tucker's testimony was crucial to the defense. When the 
State introduced evidence of other thefts, the five checks, and 
allegations of drug addiction to cocaine, the jurors probably 
utilized this information to reject his testimony and determine 
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guilt based on his purported bad character. Importantly, the State 
reiterated these improper charges in closing argument as well 
(R. 125 at 83-84). This erroneous information therefore improperly 
tipped the balancing of deliberations against Mr. Tucker. 
Admission of the drug addiction over the objection of 
Mr. Tucker may have single-handedly assured the conviction against 
him. Few crimes today carry the stigma associated with drugs and 
particularly drug addiction. The prosecutor's inquiry into a 
court-ordered attendance at a drug program implied a measure of 
addiction which jurors may have inferred as incurable and no doubt 
used in considering his propensities toward deviant behavior. These 
feelings were only exacerbated when the prosecutor erroneously 
linked the past drug admissions to his current status as an 
unemployed and possibly reformed addict. 
Such contentions presented to the jurors adversely affected 
Mr. Tucker's rights to obtain a fair trial from an impartial* jury. 
The prosecutor's introduction of his information violated due 
process as guided by evidence rules 404(b) and 403. The trial court 
erroneously overruled meritorious objections to the introduction of 
this damaging and misleading evidence and improperly denied 
Mr. Tucker's Motion for Mistrial. These errors erode confidence in 
the outcome of the trial. Absent the errors, a reasonable 
likelihood exists that the outcome would have been more favorable to 
Mr. Tucker. It follows that his conviction should be reversed and a 
new trial ordered. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Tucker 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his improperly 
obtained conviction and remand his case to the district court for 
dismissal of the charges or a new trial absent such errors. 
Respectfully submitted this (7~l ^ day of March, 1990. 
^*4f ^X 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney^ ft5r9 Def endant/Appellant 
ID G. UDAYY 
Attorney for Defendant^A^pellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RICHARD G. UDAY, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 23 0 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this <P? day j^ f^ Marc^ h, 19,90. 
- T* -
DELIVERED by 
this day of March, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
24 
shed or shop? 
A No. 
Q Did you at any time ever have in your possession 
or take any items of property which have been identified 
as belonging to Mr. Hansen and having come at some time 
from that shed? 
A No. I had never seen the property until it was 
taken out of the trailer by the police officers. 
Q Did you have further plans of your own that 
afternoon? 
A I did. 
Q What were they? 
A I had a job interview at 3:30 with West Valley 
Transmissions. 
Q Were you able to keep that? 
A No. 
MR. JONES: Objection as to relevance. 
THE COURT: Sustained. That will be 
stricken. 
Q (By Ms. Wells) Mr. Tucker, have you previously 
been convicted of any criminal offenses? 
A Yes. 
Q And what was that offense and when? 
A In March of 1988 I was convicted of a forgery, 
attempted forgery. Attempted forgery, Class A misdemeanor. 
Q And that was a misdemeanor rather than a felony? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you please explain briefly the circumstances 
Z3 
surrounding that offense and your ultimate conviction? 
Let me ask: Did you enter a plea in that matter? 
A Yes. 
Q What were the circumstances surrounding that case? 
A My sister and I were sharing a house, and I was 
putting my money into her bank account. We had a dispute 
and I wanted my money out of her account. It's a joint 
account with my mother's name on the checks. 
She wouldn't refund my money, my parents were on 
vacation and I needed my money cause I was moving out of the 
house. And in order to get another house I needed my money. 
So I forged my sister's signature to get my money. 
Q How much money was involved? 
A Less than $100. 
Q Again, did you enter a plea of guilty after being 
charged with that offense? 
A Yes. 
MS. WELLS: That's all the questions 
I have. 
CROS S -EXAMINAT ION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q Mr. Tucker, do you think you have a good recollec-
tion of the case for which you pled guilty to? 
A Do I— 
Q The attempted forgery that you just talked about 
to the Jury? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Isn't it true that you stole five checks from your 
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mother? 
A Yes. 
Q And forged her name on those checks, didn't you? 
A Yes. 
Q One of the checks—the one you pled guilty to 
was in excess of $500, wasn't it? 
A I think so. 
Q So you are not telling the Jury that you stole 
$100, are you? 
A No. 
Q How much, all totaled, did you steal from your 
mother through those checks? 
A Number one, I didn't steal it. It was my money. 
Q Well, you took checks, you stole blank checks 
from your mother, didn't you? 
A I did. 
Q And you forged her signature on five of those? 
A I did. 
Q How much money did you take? 
A I would say around six hundred something. 
Q You are telling us that the one check was in 
excess of $500 and the other four altogether only totaled 
$100? 
A There was a few that were not cashed. There was 
one in my wallet that had never been cashed. 
Q Well, isn't it true that you had had these checks 
for some time? 
A Yes. 
1 Q How long had you had these checks? 
2 A Probably three days. 
3 1 Q Y°u didn't have them more like three months? 
A I don't think so. 
Q Isn't it true that the reason that you took the 
checks and cashed them was to support your drug habit? 
A No. 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I would object--
I would ask the Court for a ruling and would like to approach 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 I the Bench. 
10 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the 
JJ I objection. The door has been opened as to the purpose for 
the money on direct examination. 
MS. WELLS: I don' t believe that the 
door was opened in that it wasn't asked of him for what 
purpose. He merely said it was his money. And I think what 
this does is goes to a rule of evidence 404 problem, 
16
 I THE COURT: Do you need to proceed 
17 further on this? 
18 I MR. JONES: I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's come to the side bar 
for just a moment. 
(Bench conference off the record.) 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Tucker, is it your testimony 
to the Jury that the only reason you took those five checks 
is because you were entitled to the money? 
25 I A Yes. 
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Q Do you remember filling out a statement, kind 
of a questionnaire or statement why you took that money? 
A 
Q 
the reason 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
To a certain degree, yes. 
Did you ever tell anyone in that statement that 
you took the money was to support a drug habit? 
1 can't remember. 
Were you on cocaine in April of 1988? 
Had I used cocaine? 
Yes. 
A few times, yes. 
Did you have a drug problem? 
Not really a problem. 
Well, have you entered or been ordered to go 
into a drug rehabilitation program? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
drug probl 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I completed it, yes. 
Did you complete the program? 
Yes. 
And when was that? 
I was ordered in, I think, June of 1988, to go. 
Was it your testimony that you didn't have a 
em at the time you entered that plea? 
No. I entered a plea of guilty. 
Excuse me, in April of 1988— 
Yes, sir. 
—you had a drug problem at that time? 
It was going to become a problem, yes. 
What about in March of 1989? 
I have been clean for over a year. 
1 I Q You were unemployed at the time of this incident? 
A Yes. 
Q And it's your testimony that you just happened 
to be in the wrong place at the wrong time on March 29, 1989? 
A So to speak. 
Q You had no idea what your friend was up to? 
A Exactly. 
^ Q You weren't on drugs that day? 
8 I A No. 
9 I Q Is it true that the only person who was hiding 
when the officers got there was yourself? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And your testimony is that Mr. Kanares is the one 
who was responsible for this burglary and theft; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q But he wasn't hiding, was he? 
A No, he was not. 
Q And the only reason you were hiding is because 
you were afraid? 
A That, and I had a speeding ticket that had went 
to a warrant, and I have done thirty days in jail on the 
forgery, and I had no desire to go back to jail. 
Q You weren't hiding, I guess, because of what 
happened over at Mr. Hansen's property? 
A No. At the time on the forgery I was beat up 
real bad by the police, and again that same day. 
Q When did you know or realize that this property 
was stolen? 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
1 indicated to the Court at the side bar during the first 
2 J break that I would like an opportunity to make a record 
and to make a further motion. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, at this time 
I would make a motion for a mistrial. The defendant made an 
appropriate motion in limine prior to the beginning of the 
7
 trial, which was subsequently heard and ruled on by the Court. 
8 Although the Court did not grant that motion, it 
9 was clearly, I believe, the order of the Court that such 
JQ admission by Mr.Tucker, should he testify, and of course under 
the case law he is required to testify in order to get the 
benefit of the motion and preserving it for appeal, and during 
that testimony he admitted to the conviction for attempted 
forgery, a Class A misdemeanor. 
He was not requested on direct examination to make 
15 any explanation beyond admission of the fact of the forgery 
16 itself, which constitutes the crime. However, on cross-
17 J examination Mr. Jones elicited from him additional information 
which I believe was elicited contrary to the ruling of the 
Court, contrary to the spirit of the motion in limine, and 
in violation of Rule 404, the Utah Rules of Evidence, parti-
cularly subsection B dealing with other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts. 
It indicates therein that evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. 
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
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proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity or a sense of mistake or accident. 
There is no exception listed within 404B that 
deals with the requirement that he explain one act by having 
to then admit to some other wrong that could not otherwise 
fit into Rule 404. 
It was clearly the intent of the prosecution to 
use that information to further inflame the Jury and indicate 
to them that this was a person of bad character, more likely 
to have engaged in criminal activity in March of 1989, than 
not. 
That is particularly true in light of the specific 
reason for which he might be impeached upon testifying, which 
is to cast doubt based upon that particular crime itself, 
as to credibility. The crime that he talked about paying 
drug debts obviously deals with a different type of offense 
that is not contemplated in the arguments made to the Court 
or in the Court's ruling and its analysis under the Banner 
test. It was merely thrown in as an addition by counsel, 
and it constitutes unfair prejudice and should warrant a 
mistrial by the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. I have had plenty 
of time to think about this, and the record should reflect 
that while not to this extent, the matters were discussed at 
the side bar conference and a proffer at the time of the 
objection was made, was noted, and it was not on the record 
because it was at the side bar. I overruled that objection, 
land I am going to deny the motion for a new trial for the 
following reasons: Under normal circumstances the prosecution] 
based on my ruling, has the right to have before the Jury 
the fact of the conviction and what the conviction was for. 
In this particular case, however, as a matter of strategy, 
and appropriate strategy, the defendant through his counsel 
sought to bring up the information before the prosecution 
had an opportunity to. That is a strategic choice, and it's 
probably a good one. But in so doing it was not just a 
statement of conviction and what the conviction was for. 
There was furthermore testimony elicited by direct examina-
tion as to what the purpose was for the act underlying the 
conviction in question. 
Once that was done, the door was opened for the 
prosecution to do more than it was otherwise entitled to do. 
My memory of that testimony was that Mr. Tucker went into 
the purposes for which he wrote bad checks. Once he did that, 
then the prosecution is entitled to ask questions on cross 
to address the question of the purposes for the withdrawals 
of money. 
As far as I'm concerned, that's all Mr. Jones did. 
Furthermore, and for that reason, I don't think 404B is 
pertinent because it was related not to additional wrongs or 
act, but instead was related only to the conviction in 
question, and in attempting to cross-examine Mr. Tucker on 
the reasons for the withdrawals. For that reason I think 
your 404B is not appropriate, so the motion is denied. 
MS. WELLS: May I just indicate one more 
thing, Your Honor? 
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Criminal No. 
guilty to the charge(s) of: 
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a copy of the charge (Info rid understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a 
r>^-o 
(Degree of Felony or Class of Misdemeanor) 
and understand the punishment for this crime may be 
. prison term, -&A + fine, plus a 25% surcharge, pursuant to 
tide 63-63-9(2) U.C.A. as amended, or both. I am not on drugs or alcohol. 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney 
who has explained my rights to me and I understand them. 
1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I have 
entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial. I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my presence 
and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also know that I have a 
right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and that I could testify on my own 
behalf, and that if I choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guflty must be by a complete 
agreement of all jurors. 
4. 1 know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that I cannot 
be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would have a 
right to appeal my conviction a nd sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if I could 
0 not afford to pay the costs for > ch appeal, that those costs would be paid by the State without cost to me. 
6. 1 know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the proceeding 
paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
7. I also know tht if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been convicted 
or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the nrespnt artiVm
 m«. «* •-
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)): 
X 
will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be filed against me for othercrimes I may have committed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing" concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10. I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents. I 
am o ^ / years of age, have attended school through the / r /[A^^^A^ _ 
understand the English language. " 
. and 1 can read and 
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I certify that I am the attorney fori 
yU>-i*4AJ 
Judge -, \ 
JLf %uJu. , the defendant named above and 1 know he' 
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him, and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made by the defendant inine ijoregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true. 
Defense Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case a g a i n s t ^ ^ A w M ^ / /X^CX^fcnHant 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. TJ*£felfc reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of th^d^fendant f^ f the plea offere^arjd that acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest. 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and ijLis ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. ^ ^ -
Done in Court this LL day of 
ATTEST 
H. DIXCN HiNDLEY 
